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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the spatial interaction of neighboring cities over their employment cycles.  
Neighboring cities, which are large and closely integrated cities within the same metro area, tend 
to have relatively similar employment cycles.  However, this is largely because they tend to be in  
the same state, not because they are neighbors.  Depending on differences in size, density, and 
human capital, neighborness usually means that cities have relatively dissimilar employment 
cycles.  I attribute this result to the tendency for cities within the same metro area to specialize 
according to function and human capital. 
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I. Introduction 
 Just as the national business cycle is often characterized as a sequence of expansion and 
recession phases, local-level employment growth can be described as a sequence of switches 
between periods of expansion and contraction—an employment cycle.1  As shown in Owyang, 
Piger, and Wall (2010), cities’ employment cycles can differ substantially from the national 
cycle and from each other: During 1990-2008, the employment cycles of a typical pair of large 
U.S. cities were in the same phase 71 percent of the time, and cities in the same state or region, 
or with similar levels of human capital, tended to have more-similar cycles. 
 This paper focuses on the employment cycles of a special type of city—neighboring 
cities—which are large, economically integrated cities within the same metro area (e.g., Dallas 
and Fort Worth, Los Angeles and Santa Ana-Anaheim, or Oakland and San Francisco).  Figure 1 
illustrates the idea of a metro area comprising two overlapping neighbors (cities 1 and 2), as 
opposed to a metro area with a single agglomeration that attenuates continuously from the center 
(city 3).  It’s natural to expect that, because their economies are closely integrated, neighboring 
cities would have similar employment cycles.
 
 Countervailing this notion, however, are models 
of urban systems, which allow the possibility that the ebbs and flows of the business cycle can be 
experienced by neighboring cites in very different ways precisely because their economies are 
closely intertwined. 
 In the evolutionary hierarchy models of Fujita and Mori (1997) and Fujita, Krugman, and 
Mori (1999), neighboring cities arise out of a single evolutionary process through which one 
                                                 
1
 Note that, because state and city GDP data are too infrequent for too short a period of time, employment data are 
used to represent the effects of the business cycle. 
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agglomeration center becomes two, each serving a different set of functions within the metro-
area economy.  These cities develop beyond the usual notion of a central city and its suburb into 
partner cities serving different functions within the metro area.  Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2002) and Berliant and Wang (2008) also have models in which neighboring cities arise and, 
unlike earlier models, the neighbors can differ in size.
2
   
 Just as any two cities’ business-cycle experiences might differ because of differences in a 
variety of factors, so can neighboring cities.  But, unlike a typical pair of distant monocentric 
cities, neighboring cities overlap in space, so their relative business cycle experiences will be 
more closely related to their spatial interactions.  In Duranton and Puga (2005) and Rossi-
Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2009), the production side this interaction results in the division of 
the functions of production (management and non-management) between central and non-central 
regions of a metro area.  Thinking more broadly, functions within a metro area can be divided 
according to process: headquarters and subsidiaries, intermediate- and final-goods production, 
factory and distribution, etc.  Likewise, different types of human capital are used in the various 
production and distribution processes, and these are endogenously distributed throughout the 
metro area.   
 Even with a division of functions, one might expect that neighbors’ responses to the 
business cycle would be very similar given that productive factors, especially labor, are highly 
mobile between neighbors.  On the other hand, the benefits of agglomeration attenuate fairly 
rapidly with distance (Rosenthal and Strange, 2008), so the spillovers that generate 
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 See Dobkins and Ioannides (2001) for a detailed look at the development of neighboring cities in the United States. 
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agglomeration might not extend across neighbors.  Likewise, the rapid attenuation of the effects 
of agglomeration can, to some extent, insulate one neighbor from the effects of macroeconomic 
events in the other.  Therefore, with a tendency for specialization within a metro area, the timing 
and intensity of economic downturns can differ a great between the central city and its neighbor, 
even if the cities share the same industries and firms.  For example, if layoffs tend to hit 
intermediate producers and distribution centers first, and these functions tend to be located 
outside the central city, then the effects of a downturn will differ between the two neighbors.  
Similarly, the central city and its neighbor will be affected differently if the downturn hits low-
human-capital labor earlier or harder and this type of labor is more prevalent one of the two 
cities.  What makes a pair of neighboring cities different from a monocentric city is that the latter 
contains all of the functions and human capital that are split between the two neighbors.  Because 
of this, the employment cycles of the neighboring cities could differ a great deal from each other 
while being relatively similar to the employment cycle of some other, monocentric city.   
 One can think of metro divisions within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as 
statistical delineations of neighboring cities.  Metro divisions, which are determined statistically 
according to their levels of employment interchange, are distinct cities, each large enough to 
have its own agglomerative center.
3
  Taking this definition at face value, my data set consists of 
quarterly payroll employment for 60 cities, 25 of which are metro divisions within 10 MSAs, 
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 According to the General Accounting Office (GAO-04-758), the combination of two or more adjacent metro 
division occurs when the employment interchange measure is at least 25.  This measure is the sum of the 
percentages of residents the metro divisions who work in the other metro division.  For employment interchange 
between 15 and 25, local opinion can be used to determine that two metro divisions are in the same MSA.  Dobkins 
and Ioannides (2001), for example, found the growth rates of neighboring cities to be interdependent. 
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with the remainder being MSAs without metro divisions.
4
  Figure 2 illustrates some of the 
variety of neighbors in my data set.  Each of the metro areas has one city that is larger than its 
neighbor(s), but the differences in size and density across metro areas can be significant.  In 
addition, state borders can either separate metro areas from each other, or divide metro divisions 
within a metro area.  In principle, it would be desirable to disaggregate metro areas even further 
using more-granular data to yield even more metro-area subcenters, as in McMillen and Smith 
(2003).  Unfortunately, the methodology that I use to determine the expansion and contraction 
phases—Markov-Switching—is difficult to implement for smaller areas (Owyang, Piger, Wall, 
Wheeler, 2008).  
 This paper is a contribution to the urban systems literature in that its purpose is to 
determine the links, if any, between the employment cycles of neighboring cities.  Because of its 
methodology and attention to relatively high-frequency data, the paper follows directly from the 
literature applying the tools of empirical macroeconomics to geographically disaggregated data.
5
  
To a large extent, this literature exists as separate from the rest of urban/regional economics in 
that it has tended to look at the myriad high-frequency time-series differences across geographic 
entities within the U.S. rather than addressing traditional urban questions: The word 
―agglomeration‖ appears only rarely.6  The present paper departs from these roots by focusing on 
                                                 
4
 I did not consider the four metro divisions of the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy MSA separately because the 
smallness of three of them make it difficult to apply the Markov-switching model that I used to determine 
employment cycles. 
5
 Notable papers in this literature include, but are not limited to, Carlino and Mills (1993); Carlino and DeFina 
(1995, 1998, 1999, 2004); Clark (1998); Carlino and Sill (2001); Del Negro (2002); Partridge and Rickman (2002, 
2005); Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2008); Owyang, Rapach, and Wall (2009); and Hamilton and Owyang 
(forthcoming). 
6
 This literature does, however, share the general outlook of the urban system literature which sees the overall 
economy as a grouping of interrelated subnational economies (Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2005). 
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the spatial and agglomerative links between cities, offering a new perspective on the organization 
of cities and the links between them. 
II. City Employment Cycles 
 To determine each city’s pattern of expansion and contraction, I apply the Markov-
switching model of Hamilton (1989) to city-level payroll-employment data.  The estimation 
procedure is a straightforward application of Kim and Nelson (1999), the details of which are 
outlined in Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005).  In this model, an employment cycle is assumed to 
have two phases—expansion and contraction—which the city economy switches between 
infrequently.  Each phase has its own structure and, therefore, its own growth rate.
7
  Deviations 
from the two growth rates are treated as noise.  Put simply, the model compares a city’s actual 
employment growth rate to its two phase growth rates and determines the probability that the 
city’s employment is in contraction.  Persistence matters in that the probability of being in 
contraction depends on the previous period’s growth rate.  By convention, a period is determined 
to be contractionary if the estimated probability of contraction exceeds 0.5. 
 The metro divisions’ employment cycles are summarized by Table 1, which lists the 
cities in order of their MSA and metro division identification numbers.  Note that, because the 
estimation uses growth rates, 1990:1 is excluded.  Quarters for which the cities are in contraction 
are denoted with a ―∎‖ and expansionary quarters are blank. Periods of national employment 
contraction are indicated by a shaded background.  As should be clear from the table, there is a 
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 Owyang, Piger, Wall, and Wheeler (2008) find that expansion growth rates are related to some of the usual 
variables used in growth regressions, but that these variables are not related to contraction growth rates.   
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strong tendency for any city to be in contraction around the same time as the country as a whole, 
indicating the occurrence of common macroeconomic events.  Nonetheless, a city’s cycle can 
differ a great deal from that of other cities and the country as a whole:  (i) Some cities did not 
experience employment contraction at all during periods of national contractions; (ii) City-level 
contractions need not be in synch with each other; and (iii) Cities can experience idiosyncratic 
contractions when nearly all other cities are in expansion.   
 As shown elsewhere for a larger set of cities, there is a broad geographic pattern to the 
occurrence of city employment contractions (Owyang, Piger, and Wall, 2010).  My present 
focus, however, is on the narrow patterns between neighboring cities.  Specifically, an 
examination of Table 1 reveals that there can be substantial differences in the employment cycles 
of neighboring cities, although some neighbors are closely related.  For example, Dallas-Plano-
Irving and Fort Worth-Arlington are very much in synch; whereas Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria and Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg have relatively little in common; and one 
would not guess that Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, Gary, and Lake County-Kenosha are all in the 
same metro area. 
 To measure the extent to which two city employment cycles are in synch, I use their 
concordance, that is, the percentage of time the two cycles are in the same phase (Harding and 
Pagan, 2002).  The concordance between the employment cycles of cities i and j is  
    (1)                                              ,11100
1



T
t
jtitjtitij SSSS
T
C  
where Sit and Sjt equal 1 when city i or j is in contraction, and zero otherwise.  T is the number of 
time periods.  Applying this to the occurrence of employment contractions summarized by Table 
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1 yields measures of concordance for each of the 1770 city pairs.  The remainder of the paper 
examines these concordances, with particular focus on the concordances between cities within 
the same metro area.  Tables 2-4 summarize important differences in the concordances between 
neighbors and non-neighbors according to their geographic designations, industrial structures, 
size and density, and human capital. 
 As reported in Table 2, the mean concordance across all 1770 city pairs is 73.6, meaning 
that, on average, two cities were in the same phase of the employment cycle 73.6 percent of the 
time.  Pairs of contiguous cities in the same metro area tended to be in synch more often than 
this, 81.1 percent of the time, so, arithmetically, the employment cycles of neighboring cities 
were more closely related than average.  By comparing the two columns of Table 3, one can see 
a strong tendency for cities to be more in synch with their neighbors than with the entire set of 
cities, although four cities—Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, Miami-Miami-Beach-Kendall, 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, and Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg—were more in synch 
with their non-neighbors than with their neighbors.  Note also the large difference in the cities’ 
mean concordances with other cities: Five had mean concordances lower than 70 and five had 
mean concordances of 80 or higher.  The range of concordances between neighbors was also 
wide: Dallas and Fort Worth were in the synch 94.4 percent of the time, whereas Washington 
and Bethesda were in synch only 61.1 percent of the time and were much more in synch with 
other cities than with each other.   
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III. Geographic Designations 
 The first step is to distinguish between the effect of simple adjacency and the effect of 
neighborness, which is a special type of adjacency.  Clearly we need to differentiate neighbors, 
which lie in the same metro area, from pairs of cities in different metro areas that merely abut 
where there is little activity (e.g., Santa Ana-Anaheim and San Diego, Austin and San Antonio, 
or Buffalo and Rochester).  It is also necessary to account for the fact that neighboring cities tend 
to be in the same state and region. 
 As reported in Table 2, the mean concordance of city pairs whose principal cities lie in 
the same state is nearly as high as for neighboring cities: 81.1 versus 80.7.  Further, some city 
pairs have a secondary state link in that one city’s outer counties are in the same state as the 
principal city and/or outlying counties of the other.  Because the mean concordance for these city 
pairs is also above average (77.4), there is some evidence that this secondary link might matter.  
It’s beyond the present scope, but an obvious possibility for state effects to matter is that 
differences in state-level policies affect the timing and the length of employment cycles, thereby 
accounting for at least some of the above-average intra-metro concordance.  Such policies might 
include corporate and personal income tax rates, unemployment insurance benefits, sales taxes, 
banking regulation, minimum wage, etc.   
 To control for the geographic designations discussed above, I estimate three versions of 
the following: 
(2)                                        ,ln
60
1
ijijij
k
kij NAC   

ijXγ  
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where the αks are city dummies that are equal to 1 for k = i or j, Aij is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if i and j are adjacent (whether or not they are in the same metro area), and Nij equals 1 
if i and j are adjacent and in the same metro area.  The coefficient on Nij is the direct effect of 
neighborness as separate from simple adjacency.  Equation (2) also includes Xij, which is a 
vector of dummies indicating whether i and j have their principal cities in the same state, have 
outlying counties in the same state as the principal city or outlying counties of the other, have 
principal cities in the same Census division, or whether they are both the principal metro division 
in their metro areas.
8
 
 Results for the estimations of (2) are provided in Table 5.  The first set of results, Model 
A, is determined under the assumption that neighborness is no different from adjacency and that 
there are no state and regional effects.  This estimation yields a statistically significant effect for 
adjacency.  Specifically, simple adjacency tends to add 13.8 points to a city-pair’s concordance 
[ )1(100
ˆ
 e ].  Because the economies of neighboring cities are strongly intertwined, one 
might expect that they would tend to be more in synch with each other than would two cities that 
are simply adjacent.  This is not the case, however, when neighborness is treated separately from 
adjacency, as in Model B: the effect of adjacency becomes even larger and the effect of 
neighborness is statistically no different from zero.   
 This result does not account for the possibility of state and regional effects, which were 
found by Owyang, Piger and Wall (2010) to be important.  Nor does it account for the possible 
relationship across the principal cities of metro areas, harkening back to Christaller’ s (1933) 
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 The principal metro division is the one that is first in the MSA’s list of major cities. 
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central place theory.  To differing degrees, every metro area has one main city atop the local 
hierarchy that serves as something like a central place.  As discussed in the introduction, the fact 
that neighbors tend to develop into such a hierarchy suggests a separation of roles and functions 
within a metro area.  The larger city, for example, might include headquarters and offices while 
the smaller city contains space-intensive activities such as production and transport.  Under such 
a separation of roles and functions within a metro area, there would be a tendency for neighbors 
to have disparate employment cycles.  Further, across metro areas, cities in the same tier of the 
urban hierarchy would tend to have similar employment cycles.  There is certainly evidence of 
this as the average concordance between the principal cities in each metro area is 78.5, which is 
five points higher than the average concordance between non-principal cities.  Further, neighbors 
are more distinct in size and density from each other than are non-neighbors: the average 
difference in the number of establishments between neighbors was 95.2 thousand, whereas the 
average difference between non-neighbors was 45.3 thousand; and the average difference in the 
number of establishments per square mile was 41 for neighbors and 24 for non-neighbors. 
 To control for the urban hierarchy, I remove the restriction on γ to obtain Model C, for 
which the effect of adjacency is statistically insignificant.  Instead, the influence of adjacency on 
concordance is now picked up by the effect of cities being in the same state and by the position 
of cities in their local hierarchy.  Being in the same state tends to account for 13.5 concordance 
point, while the concordance of two cities atop their urban hierarchy tends to be 3.4 points higher 
than for other pairs of cities.  
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IV. Agglomeration 
 The estimation in the previous section used the principal-cities dummy to account for the 
urban hierarchy and found that neighboring cities will differ because one of them serves as the 
central place within the metro area.  Because there is a lot of heterogeneity across pairs of 
neighbors in terms of their relative sizes and densities, however, the principal-city dummy is 
probably too blunt to capture the full importance of functional specialization.  While there is a 
tendency for neighboring cities to look like those in theoretical models—the principal city being 
larger and denser than its partner—this doesn’t capture the variety across metro divisions.  This 
point is illustrated by Figure 3, which plots the proportional differences in density and size for 
the neighbors in my data set.  The neighbors that best fit the Christaller notion of urban hierarchy 
are New York/Newark, New York/Edison, Chicago/Gary, and Philadelphia/Wilmington.  At the 
other extreme are San Francisco/Oakland, which are relatively twin-like, and Detroit/Warren and 
Los Angeles/Santa Ana-Anaheim, where the larger city is the less-dense city. 
 To capture the diversity of agglomeration between neighbors, I replace the principal-city 
dummy with measures of size and density to estimate 
   (3)                      ,ln
60
1
ijijijij
k
kij NNAC   

ijijij SδSωXγ  
where Sij is a vector of variables measuring the extent to which i and j are similarly 
agglomerated.  To differentiate the importance of agglomeration for neighbors from that of non-
neighbors, the agglomeration vector is also interacted with the Nij dummy.  Similarity in 
agglomeration is measured by log(1 -│si - sj│/(si+sj)), where si are the sj are the sizes (number of 
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establishments) or densities (establishments per square mile) of i and j.
9
  As reported below, 
there is little difference in my results if size and density are calculated using employment rather 
than the number of establishments.
10
  Table 6 provides the estimation results for four versions of 
(3):  Model D assumes that there is no separate agglomeration relationship for neighbors and 
Model E does not impose this restriction.  Both of these models measure size and density using 
the number of establishments.  Models F and G use employment instead. 
 According to the results for Model D, any two cities, whether they are neighbors or not, 
will have a higher concordance if they are more similar in either size or density.  The positive 
sign on size similarity might be because size is an indicator of the diversity of functions within a 
city: similarly diverse cities will have similar employment cycles.  Also, if density is an indicator 
of the types of functions that a city performs, then cities of similar density might be expected to 
have similar employment cycles.   
 Model E is more intriguing in that it shows that the relationship between concordance and 
agglomeration for neighbors is very different than for non-neighbors: the coefficients on size and 
density are much larger and, for density, has the opposite sign.  Consider a metro area with a 
large, dense principal city and a small, spread out secondary city.  The difference in their 
densities indicates the extent to which they serve different functions within the metro area, such 
as headquarters and production.  The less similar their densities, the greater the segregation 
according to function, and the more the cities are intertwined.  At the extreme, the very dense 
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 The number of establishments is the average over 2000-2005 and is from the Census Bureau’s State and 
Metropolitan Area Data Book as of February 4, 2009.  Area is from the same source and is in square miles. 
10
 Unfortunately, because it is not available for metro divisions, I was unable to use the area data from Saiz (2010). 
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city has the headquarters of all of the metro area’s firms while the spread out city has all of their 
production.  So, to a much greater extent than non-neighbors, the employment cycles for 
neighboring cities are more similar to one another the less-similar they are in density. 
 Size works in the opposite direction, perhaps because of firms for which density and, 
therefore, functional separation, are not particularly important.  Some of these firms, which 
might include banks or insurance companies, don’t have separate production facilities and might 
be found in both cities, with all of their functions in the same city.  Similar-sized cities have 
similar numbers of these types of firms and will, therefore, have similar employment cycles. 
 The effects of neighbors’ agglomeration on concordance are quantified for all neighbor 
pairs in the penultimate section.  Note that the results do not depend on which measure of size 
and density is used.  I have chosen to use the number of establishments, but as shown by Models 
F and G, I obtain very similar result using employment instead. 
V. Industrial Structure and Human Capital 
 There is a large literature examining and explaining differences across sectors in the 
severity of business-cycle fluctuations (Stock and Watson, 1999), so one might expect that cities 
with similar industries would have similar employment cycles.  Coulson (1993) and Clark 
(1998), for example, demonstrate how employment fluctuations can be decomposed into 
national, subnational, and industry shocks.  Coupling this with the observation that neighboring 
cities tend to be more sectorally similar than are other pairs of cities (see Table 4), we might 
expect that this industry effect be more important for neighboring cities.  This was not found by 
14 
 
Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2010), but they did not focus on the role that industrial similarity 
might play between neighboring cities.  
 To estimate the importance of industry differences, I include a new variable that 
measures the similarity in industry mix between two cities.  Specifically, I use the industry 
similarity index Iij = log(1 - ∑k│xik - xjk│), where xik and xjk are the shares of total employment in 
industry k:
11
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The estimation results for equation (4) are summarized by Table 6.  Model H assumes that the 
relationship between industrial similarity and concordance is the same for neighbors and non-
neighbors.  Model G allows for a different relationship for neighbors.  As expected, the results 
indicate that similarity in industrial mix is positively related to similarity in employment cycles 
between any two cities in the sample, including neighbors.  It is perhaps surprising, however, 
that the relationship between neighbors is no different than that between any two cities.  One 
might have expected that two neighbors with more-similar industrial mixes would be more 
tightly integrated and, therefore, have more-similar employment cycles.  It is possible, however, 
that industrial mix is not sufficient to capture this integration between neighbors, and might even 
obscure it.  This is because a firm might outsource many of its functions (accounting, legal 
services, maintenance, temporary workers, etc.), so the employees performing these functions are 
not counted as being employed in the firm’s industry.  
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 These shares are averaged over the sample period. 
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 The final category of potential determinants of concordance between neighboring cities is 
human capital.  As reported in Table 4, between-neighbor differences in industrial mix and 
human capital differ from those between non-neighbors.  Neighbors are relatively similar racially 
but relatively less-similar in educational attainment: The sum of absolute difference in race 
shares is 21.7 for neighbors and 25 for non-neighbors, and the difference in shares of the 
population aged 25 and older with at least a high school diploma was 4 percentage points for 
neighbors and 3.7 percentage points for non-neighbors.  When comparing two non-neighboring 
cities, differences in their racial composition and educational attainment serve as measures of 
their differences in human capital.  These human capital differences might lead to fairly 
straightforward differences in employment cycles.  Between neighboring cities, however, one 
needs to take account of the ability of workers to commute between the two cities.   
 Differences in racial composition between neighbors can reflect spatial/racial mismatch.  
For whatever reason, there is a tendency for metro areas to be divided internally by race and, on 
a larger scale, for the largest city in a metro area to have a higher concentration of minority 
groups.
12
  Potential employers, however, are spread more evenly across two cities.
13
  The greater 
the spatial/racial mismatch between cities, the more likely it is that members of every racial 
group will commute between their city of residence and their city of employment.  According to 
spatial/racial mismatch, therefore, the more-similar two neighbors are in their racial composition, 
the less commuting there will be between the cities, and the less integrated their labor markets 
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 Martin (2004) and Hellerstein, Neumark, and McInerney (2008) provide recent estimates of the extent of 
spatial/racial mismatch.  
13
 This is, admittedly, a very partial-equilibrium explanation and takes the location of employers and residents as 
given.  Because the present concern is with relatively high-frequency events, however, mobility is most likely a 
secondary concern.  See Arnott (1998) for a general equilibrium treatment of spatial mismatch. 
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will be.  In other words, spatial/racial mismatch can mean that neighboring cities that are more 
similar in their racial compositions will have lower concordance, all else equal. 
 Just like any two cities, we might expect educational similarity to be related to 
concordance between neighboring cities because downturns hit the less-educated more sharply.
14
  
There is a second effect for neighbors, however, because of the relative ease with which people 
can move residence and/or jobs within a metro area.  People will choose which city to live in and 
might choose to work in the other city.  If we think of educational similarity as a measure of the 
employment substitutability of residents of one city for residents of the other, then neighboring 
cities that have similar levels of educational attainment will have more-integrated labor markets.  
Therefore, neighbors’ employment cycles will be more similar to one another the more similar 
the cities’ educational attainment. 
 To control for human capital similarities, I use a racial similarity index that makes use of 
population racial shares, and an educational similarity index that uses the share of the population 
aged 25 and older with at least a high school diploma.
15
  Each of these variables is included on 
its own and in interaction with the neighbor dummy.  Adding these variables to (4), I estimate  
 
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where Hij is a vector of the two human capital similarity indices.  The estimation results for three 
versions of (5) are presented in Table 8:  Model J assumes that the effect of human capital 
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 Hoynes (2000) and Engemann and Wall (2010) show how the effects of recessions are deeper those with less than 
a high school degree.   
15
 Race and education data are for 2006 from the State and Metropolitan Area Data Book.  For robustness, I 
included higher levels of educational attainment also, but this did not add anything to the results, possibly because of 
the levels of educational attainment are highly correlated. 
(5) 
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similarities are the same for neighbors and non-neighbors and Model K removes this restriction.  
Model L is included to demonstrate the role of city effects in the estimation and imposes the 
restriction on the most-general specification (Model K) that city effects are zero.   
  As one can see from the results for Model J and K, I find no general relationship across 
cities between concordance and human capital similarity, although there is a significant 
relationship for neighboring cities.  Specifically, consistent with spatial/racial mismatch, 
neighboring cities with similar racial mixes have less-similar employment cycles; and, consistent 
with the notion that educational similarity indicates greater substitutability of labor between 
neighbors, neighboring cities with similar educational attainment have more-similar employment 
cycles.   
 The final estimation, Model L, is a test of the importance of allowing for city-specific 
effects, which control for the differing tendencies of cities to be in concord with the rest.  They 
capture the links between a city and the rest of the country that might make its relationships over 
the business cycle differ from the average.  New York, for example, might have financial links 
with other cities that are not captured by the included variables: It is not just the size of its 
financial sector that matters, but the fact that it is the center of the nation’s financial system.  
Similarly, the experiences of cities like Orlando and Las Vegas might be closely linked to those 
of every other city if its recreation and entertainment industries are very sensitive to fluctuations 
everywhere else.  As is apparent from the results for Model L, the results depend a great deal on 
whether or not city effects are included: the coefficients on several variables reverse sign or 
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become statistically insignificant.  Finally, a likelihood-ratio test easily rejects the null 
hypothesis that city-specific effects do not matter for the estimation. 
VI. Neighborness Quantified  
 According to the results of the previous sections, there is no direct effect of neighborness 
on concordance, although there are effects via agglomeration and human capital.  This section 
quantifies these effects for each of the neighbor pairs, finding that neighborness tends to decrease 
the concordance of neighbors’ employment cycles.  Note that the regression results show the 
effects of similarities between neighbors, but, for expositional purposes, this section quantifies 
those results in terms of differences between neighbors.   
 For reference, the proportional differences between neighbors in size and density (the 
differences divided by the sums) are presented in Table 9A.  These are the same data presented 
earlier in Figure 3.  Table 9A also provides the differences in the sums of racial shares and in the 
percentage with a high school diploma.  The effects of these differences on the neighbors’ 
concordances are presented in Table 9B, which also includes each pair’s concordance and the 
total effects of neighborness.  Because they are part of the same process, the effects of size and 
density are combined together to obtain the total effect of agglomeration on concordance. 
 Recall from Figure 3 that, although there is a tendency for size and density differences 
between neighbors to go hand in hand, there are significant deviations from this tendency.  Also 
recall from the discussion in section IV that this means that size and density differences, which 
have opposite effects on concordance, tend to be in tension.  All of this is evident from Table 9B 
in that the effect of agglomeration on neighbors’ concordance varies a great deal: Chicago and 
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Lake County, which are relatively similar in density but very different in size, have a 
concordance of 66.7, which would be 21.6 points higher if they had the same size and density.  
At the other end, New York and Newark, which differ a great deal in both size and density, have 
a concordance of 80.6, which would be 7.7 points lower than if they had the same size and 
density.  More often than not, agglomeration has a negative effect on neighbors’ concordance, 
and the average effect is to reduce it by 3 points.   
 Racial and educational differences can have very large effects for some neighbors.  The 
biggest differences in neighbors’ racial composition are for Detroit/Warren and New 
York/Nassau-Suffolk.  According to the estimates, the concordances for these city pairs are 15.7 
and 11.8 points higher, respectively, because of their large differences in race shares.  
Differences in educational attainment affect the concordance of four city pairs by 10 points or 
more: For Miami and Fort Lauderdale, the almost 11 point difference in educational attainment 
is responsible for an almost 18 point lower concordance. 
 The total effect of neighborness on concordance tends to be negative.  That is, being 
neighbors means that concordance is 4.3 points lower, on average.  There are five pairs of 
neighbors for which neighborness has double-digit negative effects on concordance.  The largest 
of these effects, driven primarily by agglomeration, is 21.2 points for Chicago and Lake County.  
Although for most pairs of neighbors the effect of neighborness is negative, there are notable 
exceptions.  For example, neighborness means that, largely due to their very different racial 
compositions, concordance is 11.7 point higher for Detroit and Warren.  
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VII. Concluding Remarks  
 On average, the employment cycles of neighboring cities are more similar to one another 
than are the cycles of non-neighboring cities.  Much of this is due to the tendency for 
neighboring cities to be in the same state.  Once this and other effects are controlled for, 
neighborness makes the employment cycles of the average pair of neighboring cities less similar 
to one another.  There is a good deal of heterogeneity in the effect of neighborness on the 
concordance of employment cycles, and it depends on differences in agglomeration and human 
capital.  In particular, the more similar neighbors are in density and racial composition, the less 
similar their employment cycles will be; and the more similar they are in size and educational 
attainment, the more similar their employment cycles will be.  I attribute these results to the 
tendency for cities within the same metro area to specialize according to function and human 
capital.   
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Figure 2. The Variety of Neighboring Cities 
The height indicates the level of employment, population, etc. at that location.  
The black lines are state borders. 
Figure 1. Neighboring Cities 
The height indicates the level of employment, population, etc. at that location 
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Figure 3. The Variety of Agglomeration Between Neighboring Cities 
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2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                      █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                 
Gary █    █ █ █ █        █                        █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █          █ █ █   █   
Lake County-Kenosha                                            █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █
Dallas-Plano-Irving    █ █ █ █ █                                     █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                   
Fort Worth-Arlington   █ █ █ █ █ █                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                  
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █     █   █         █        █  █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █  █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy  █ █ █                              █  █      █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █  █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                              █ █ █ █  █ █ █ █ █                  █
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                              █ █ █ █ █                   █ █ █ █ █
Ft. Lauderdale-Pampano Beach-Deerfield Beach █ █ █ █ █ █ █                         █ █             █ █ █     █          █    █ █ █ █ █ █
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                      █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                   
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach █ █ █ █ █ █ █  █                                                          █ █ █ █ █ █
Edison █ █ █ █ █ █                                                                   
Nassau-Suffolk █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                               
Newark-Union █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █            █                                  █    █             
New York-Wayne-White Plains █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                  █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                   
Camden █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                                 
Philadelphia █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                 
Wilmington   █ █ █ █ █ █                                    █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                     
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward    █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                           █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                          █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █               
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett    █           █                             █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                   
Tacoma    █                                      █ █ █ █ █ █ █                        █
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                                
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithresburg █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █          █ █ █ █                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █
1992 1993 1994 1995
Table 1. City-Level Employment Cycles for the 25 Metro Divisions
A █ indicates a quarter in which the city was in an employment contraction.  The shaded areas are periods during which national employment was in contraction (Owyang, Piger, and Wall; 2012).  Metro divisions 
within the same MSA are grouped together and separated by a dashed line.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20071996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20011990 1991
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Table 2. Mean Concordance and 
Geography 
All City Pairs 73.6 
Neighbors 81.1 
Same Principal State 80.7 
Same Secondary State 77.4 
Same Census Division 74.0 
Table 3. Mean Concordances for Metro Divisions 
MSA Metro Division (City) 
With 
Neighbor(s) 
With All 
Cities 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, 
Il-IN-WI 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL 72.9 80.8 
Gary, IN 79.2 72.6 
Lake County-Kenosha, Il-WI 66.7 66.1 
Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington, TX 
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 
94.4 
80.1 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 80.6 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, 
MI 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 
75.0 
56.6 
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy, MI 65.3 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-
Santa Ana, CA 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 
86.1 
74.4 
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 70.2 
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-
Pompano Beach, FL 
Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL 84.0 71.0 
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 79.2 81.3 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL 88.9 70.3 
New York-Northern New 
Jersey-Long Island, NY-
NJ-PA 
Edison, NJ 86.8 
 
72.1 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 84.7 71.9 
Newark-Union, NJ-PA 85.4 69.5 
New York-Wayne-White Plains, NY-NJ 81.5 79.7 
Philadelphia-Camden-
Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-
MD 
Camden, NJ 82.6 72.7 
Philadelphia, PA 84.0 80.0 
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 86.1 79.9 
San Francisco-Oakland-
Fremont, CA 
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 
75.0 
59.6 
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 70.0 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, 
WA 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 
86.1 
77.0 
Tacoma, WA 72.2 
Washington-Arlington-
Alex’a, DC-VA-MD-WV 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 
61.1 
72.5 
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg, MD 70.3 
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Table 4. Differences in Agglomeration, Industry, and Human Capital 
 Neighbors Non-Neighbors 
Difference in number of establishments (thousands) 95.2 45.3 
Difference in establishments per square mile  41.0 24.0 
Sum of differences in industry shares 19.8 24.5 
Sum of differences in race shares
a
 21.7 25.0 
Difference in share with high school diploma 4.0 3.7 
a
 White, Black, Asian, and American Indian or Alaska Native 
Table 5. Concordance and Geographic Designations 
 
  Model A 
 
  Model B   Model C 
 
Coeff. 
 
s.e. 
 
Coeff. 
 
s.e.  Coeff. s.e. 
Constant 4.448 * 0.015 
 
4.448 * 0.015 4.457 * 0.015 
Adjacent 0.129 * 0.027 
 
0.158 * 0.036 0.060  0.037 
Neighbor     -0.044  0.051 -0.020  0.045 
Principal State 
       
 0.127 * 0.022 
Secondary State 
       
 0.027  0.022 
Census Division 
       
 -0.012  0.009 
Principal Cities 
       
 0.033 † 0.017 
Log likelihood 1300.709 1301.082     1330.713 
R
2
 0.5609 0.5611     0.5755 
Adjusted R
2 
0.5457 0.5452     0.5601 
A * or † indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. City 
dummies are suppressed for space considerations. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
corrected. 
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Table 6. Concordance and Agglomeration 
   Model D    Model E    Model F    Model G 
 
Coeff. 
 
   s.e. 
 
Coeff. 
 
   s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. 
Constant 4.474 * 0.017 
 
4.472 * 0.017  4.473 * 0.017 4.470 * 0.017 
Adjacent 0.059  0.038 
 
0.062  0.038  0.060  0.038 0.064 † 0.038 
Neighbor -0.026  0.046 0.021  0.052  -0.026  0.045 0.030  0.050 
Principal State 0.125 * 0.022 0.124 * 0.022  0.125 * 0.022 0.123 * 0.022 
Secondary State 0.026  0.022 0.020  0.022  0.027  0.022 0.023  0.022 
Census Division -0.012  0.009 -0.013  0.009  -0.012  0.009 -0.013  0.009 
Size  0.019 * 0.009 0.017 † 0.009  0.018 * 0.009 0.014  0.009 
Neighbor×Size     0.203 * 0.043      0.204 * 0.032 
Density 0.013 † 0.007 
 
0.013 † 0.007  0.015 * 0.007 0.015 * 0.007 
Neighbor×Density 
    
-0.208 * 0.064      -0.194 * 0.049 
Log Likelihood 1333.905 1339.040 1333.285 1339.976 
R
2
 0.5771 0.5795 0.5768   0.5799 
Adjusted R
2
 0.5610 0.5629 0.5607   0.5634 
A * or † indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. City dummies are 
suppressed for space considerations. Models D and E use the number of establishments to calculate size and 
density, whereas Models F and G use total employment. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-corrected. 
Table 7. Concordance and Industrial Mix 
 
         Model H 
 
 Model I 
 
Coeff. 
 
   s.e. 
 
Coeff. 
 
   s.e. 
Constant 4.485 * 0.018 
 
4.485 * 0.018 
Adjacent 0.058  0.039 
 
0.058  0.039 
Neighbor 0.023  0.052 0.015  0.088 
Principal State 0.121 * 0.023 0.121 * 0.023 
Secondary State 0.016  0.022 0.016  0.022 
Census Division -0.012  0.009 -0.012  0.009 
Size  0.016 † 0.009 0.016 † 0.009 
Neighbor×Size 0.203 * 0.043 0.204 * 0.042 
Density 0.013 † 0.007 0.013 † 0.007 
Neighbor×Density -0.209 * 0.065 -0.207 * 0.070 
Industrial Mix 0.061 † 0.034 0.061 † 0.034 
Neighbor×Industrial Mix     -0.044  0.307 
Log Likelihood 1340.577   1340.580 
R
2
 0.5802   0.5802 
Adjusted R
2
 0.5634   0.5632 
A * or † indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. City dummies are suppressed for space considerations. Standard errors 
are heteroskedasticity-corrected. 
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Table 8. Concordance and Human Capital 
 
Model J Model K       Model L 
 
Coeff. 
 
s.e. 
 
Coeff. 
 
s.e.  Coeff. s.e. 
Constant 4.494 * 0.023 4.496 * 0.023  4.278 * 0.011 
Adjacent 0.055  0.039 0.055  0.040  0.007 0.046 
Neighbor 0.023  0.089 0.062  0.067  0.107 0.099 
Principal State 0.120 * 0.023 0.120 * 0.023  0.087 * 0.019 
Secondary State 0.014  0.022 0.015  0.022  0.029 0.032 
Census Division -0.013  0.009 -0.013  0.009  0.002 0.011 
Size  0.016 † 0.009 0.017 † 0.009  -0.037 * 0.011 
Neighbor×Size 0.204 * 0.041 0.196 * 0.032  0.135 * 0.051 
Density 0.012 † 0.007 0.013 † 0.007  0.001 0.007 
Neighbor×Density -0.210 * 0.071 -0.224 * 0.061  -0.162 * 0.080 
Industrial Mix 0.060 † 0.034 0.060 † 0.034  -0.038 † 0.020 
Neighbor×Industrial Mix -0.012  0.309 0.139  0.236  0.029 0.468 
Racial Mix  0.015  0.024 0.016  0.024  0.136 * 0.017 
Neighbor×Racial Mix     -0.210 * 0.094 0.077 0.068 
Share with a HS Diploma 0.031  0.118 0.032  0.118  -0.475 * 0.113 
Neighbor×Share with a HS Diploma     1.804 * 0.537 0.728 0.501 
Log likelihood 1341.019 1343.138       639.807 
R
2
 0.5804 0.5814       0.0734 
Adjusted R
2 
0.5629 0.5634       0.0335 
A * or † indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. City dummies 
are suppressed for space considerations, except for Model L, which does not allow for them. Standard errors 
are heteroskedasticity-corrected. 
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Table 9A. Differences Between Neighbors 
 Agglomeration Human Capital 
Neighbor Pair Size
a 
Density
b 
Race
c
 Education
d 
Chicago/Gary 86.1 68.9 10.0 2.4 
Chicago/Lake County 79.6 15.8 27.0 3.6 
Dallas/Fort Worth 39.6 16.9 9.0 2.2 
Detroit/Warren 32.7 46.3 67.0 7.4 
Los Angeles/Santa Ana 47.8 29.0 15.0 7.7 
Miami/Fort Lauderdale 13.4 10.4 14.0 10.8 
Fort Lauderdale/W. Palm Beach 15.4 38.1 20.0 1.1 
New York/Edison 66.7 68.6 36.0 8.0 
New York/Nassau-Suffolk 53.7 42.4 42.0 8.8 
New York/Newark 67.1 74.8 17.0 4.8 
Newark/Edison 0.8 12.9 29.0 3.2 
Philadelphia/Camden 53.9 35.2 13.0 0.6 
Philadelphia/Wilmington 66.3 43.5 9.0 1.1 
Camden/Wilmington 19.3 9.8 5.0 0.5 
San Francisco/Oakland 0.8 18.7 15.0 1.0 
Seattle/Tacoma 65.1 30.7 10.0 2.1 
Washington/Bethesda 51.8 10.1 30.0 2.6 
Average 44.7 33.6 21.6 4.0 
a 
Proportional difference in the number of establishments. 
b 
Proportional difference in 
establishments per square mile. 
c 
Difference in the sum of race shares differences.  
d 
Difference in percentage of people 25 years and older with a high school diploma. 
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Table 9B. The Effects of Neighborness on Concordance 
Neighbor Pair Concordance 
Agglomer- 
ation
a Race Education
 
Total Effect
b 
Chicago/Gary 79.2 -10.1 1.9 -3.7 -11.9 
Chicago/Lake County 66.7 -21.6 6.2 -5.8 -21.2 
Dallas/Fort Worth 94.4 -6.0 2.1 -4.2 -8.1 
Detroit/Warren 75.0 3.8 15.7 -7.7 11.7 
Los Angeles/Santa Ana 86.1 -4.4 3.1 -12.0 -13.4 
Miami/Fort Lauderdale 79.2 -0.3 3.1 -17.9 -15.2 
Fort Lauderdale/W. Palm 
Beach 
88.9 6.3 3.9 -1.6 8.7 
New York/Edison 79.2 3.7 8.4 -11.9 0.2 
New York/Nassau-Suffolk 84.7 -2.7 11.8 -14.9 -5.7 
New York/Newark 80.6 7.7 3.3 -6.9 4.0 
Newark/Edison 90.3 2.4 6.1 -4.7 3.9 
Philadelphia/Camden 80.6 -4.5 2.5 -0.9 -2.9 
Philadelphia/Wilmington 87.5 -7.7 1.9 -1.8 -7.7 
Camden/Wilmington 84.7 -1.6 0.9 -0.8 -1.5 
San Francisco/Oakland 75.0 3.2 2.4 -1.2 4.3 
Seattle/Tacoma 86.1 -10.8 2.1 -3.5 -12.2 
Washington/Bethesda 61.1 -8.6 5.9 -3.5 -6.2 
Average 81.1 -3.0 4.8 -6.1 -4.3 
a 
The combined effect of size (proportional difference in establishments per square mile) and density (difference 
in the sum of differences in race shares).  
b 
The sum across the three effects, which is the total effect that being 
neighbors has on the concordance of the two cities. 
